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Abstract:  
We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith 
(2000) to allow for labor supply, home production, match-specific shocks and 
endogenous divorce. We study nonparametric identification using panel data on marital 
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household resource sharing. 
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1 Introduction
Lundberg and Pollak (1996) end their insightful survey on bargaining and (re)distribution
in marriage by stating that “bargaining models provide an opportunity for integrating the
analysis of distribution within marriage with a matching or search model of the marriage
market.” They make this statement after arguing that policy interventions affecting the
distribution of resources within the family can have very different short-run and long-run
effects because of marriage market equilibrium feedback.
This strategy was a recipe for success in macroeconomics. A series of applied search-
matching papers on the macrodynamics of marriage and distribution were indeed pub-
lished shortly after Lundberg and Pollak’s survey.1 Surprisingly enough the early contri-
butions of Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), McElroy (1990) and
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) did not generate the same amount of applied microeconomic
work. Surely the fault can be laid to P.-A. Chiappori who, in a series of influential pa-
pers,2 demonstrated that assuming efficiency was sufficient to deliver testable empirical
restrictions.3
However, Lundberg and Pollak’s concern resurfaces as soon as the aim of the empirical
work is not only to test a theory but also to understand the effects of family and anti-
poverty policies such as, for example, the Working Family Tax Credit program in the
UK or the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA. Collective models very successfully
describe resource sharing within the family given a sharing rule. A matching model –
that is an equilibrium model of the marriage market – is required in order to endogenize
the distribution of powers in the family (Chiappori, 2012).
This is the reason behind the recent revival of interest for matching markets. Long
after Becker’s seminal work (Becker, 1973, 1974, 1981), Choo and Siow (2006) were the
first to estimate a transferable utility model of the marriage market using the perfect-
information assignment framework of Shapley and Shubik (1971).4 Transferable utility
models postulate the existence of a match surplus, function of spouses’ characteristics,
to be shared between spouses. A matching equilibrium is a distribution of spouses’ types
and a way of sharing the surplus that is such that no couple recomposition can improve
1 See Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000), Caucutt,
Guner, and Knowles (2002), Gould and Paserman (2003), Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005).
2 See Chiappori, 1988, 1992, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene, 1994, Browning and
Chiappori, 1998, Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002. A dynamic version of the collective model was
explored by Mazzocco (2004, 2007).
3 The assumption of efficient allocations within the family has been disputed, in particular, by Del Boca
and Flinn (2005, 2006, 2009).
4 Dagsvik (2000) had previously developed a non-transferable utility model. Other applications of
transferable utility models to to marriage markets include Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2008), Chiappori
and Oreffice (2008), Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009), Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2011). Hitsch,
Hortacsu, and Ariely (2010) is another recent application of a non-transferable utility framework using
the Gale-Shapley algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
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aggregate utility.5 Choo, Seitz, and Siow (2008a,b) are early attempts to propose an
empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation and labor supply.
In this paper we follow a different route. We extend the search-matching models of Lu
and McAfee (1996) and Shimer and Smith (2000), and the empirical implementation of
Wong (2003), to allow for labor supply and domestic production. Men and women differ
by a vector of characteristics, which in our empirical application comprise education, the
wage and an index of family values. Both spouses decide how much time to allocate to
market work, leisure and to the in-house production of a public good. Home production
requires some market goods expenditure as input. So spouses must also decide how
much income to save for home production. They take these decisions cooperatively by
divorce-threat Nash bargaining.
By saving time and money for home production spouses can transfer utility to each
other. This is the first source of marriage externalities. Secondly, existing complemen-
tarities between spouses’ types are embodied in domestic production’s total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), which we interpret as public good quality. This is the supplement of
well-being that spouses enjoy just by being together, and that is not produced by time
and expenditure inputs, for example because they share the same cultural interests or
family values. Individuals can thus compensate income differences by monetary and time
transfers, but such transfers may not be able to compensate for the disutility of education
or family values mismatch.
One advantage of the sequential search framework is that a single dimension of match
heterogeneity is enough to introduce the amount of noise necessary to change the binary
decision of matching, given male and female types, into a probability. Match-specific het-
erogeneity is subject to infrequent shocks in order to endogenize divorce. The probability
of divorce at any point in time is the probability of a shock occurrence times one minus
the matching probability. This modeling strategy not only allows to characterize good
matches as matches that are consummated with a high probability but also as matches
that last longer. In addition, this will allow us to separately identify the matching proba-
bilities from the rates at which singles meet in the bachelor market and the rate at which
the match-specific component is reset.
Another advantage of the search-matching framework is that time is a natural di-
mension of the model as married couples must anticipate the risk of divorce and single
individuals must predict their chances of meeting the right partner. Our model thus
goes a long way toward fulfilling Lundberg and Pollak’s program. It is an equilibrium
5 Choo and Siow’s empirical model is a static, multinomial logit models where every individual, char-
acterized by some discrete type i = 1, ...,K, is endowed with a vector of extreme-value distributed
idiosyncratic tastes, one for each matching characteristic j = 1, ...,K. Without type-specific random
utilities, matching would be perfect and few match combinations (i, j) would be observed. Decker, Lieb,
McCann, and Stephens (2013) provide useful theoretical results on Choo and Siow’s model. Galichon
and Salanié (2012) extend it to a larger class of distributions of tastes, and Dupuy and Galichon (2014)
extend it to continuous characteristics.
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search-matching model. Spouses share time and income resources collectively via Nash
bargaining. Contracts are dynamic spot contracts without commitment. The threat
point is the intertemporal value of divorce. Divorce is endogenous, triggered by public
good quality shocks.
We identify and estimate it in two steps. First we use data on the distribution of
male and female exogenous types (education, family values and wages) by marital status
at a given point in time, as well as the distribution of types in the flows of new marriages
and divorces, to estimate meeting rates for singles (assuming that married people do not
search for alternative partners), divorce rates and matching probabilities. Second, we use
time use data to estimate preferences, the home production function, the Nash bargaining
parameter and the distribution of the match-specific shock. Identification rests on the
existence of an instrument for home production. Specifically, we exclude the family values
index from the list of variables conditioning the tradeoff for private consumption and
leisure. We use GMM to estimate a parametric specification. We show that public good
quality (the TFP of home production) is in a one-to-one relationship with the matching
probability given the other parameters. This allows us to back out public good quality
nonparametrically. Lastly, we show that the Nash bargaining parameter is identified from
leisure and home production specialization, and that the variance of the match-specific
shock is identified by second-order moments of time uses (given types).
The collective framework takes population type distributions as given and does not
relate them to the parameters of private preferences, home production and the sharing
rule. Partial identification is possible if there exist environmental factors shifting the
sharing rule but not individual preferences, and the sharing rule is identified up to an
additive function of prices. This is true as well for bargaining models with exogenous
threat points. By subsuming the collective model into an equilibrium theory of match-
ing, we can make use of the considerable amount of information that is incorporated in
matching probabilities to completely identify the sharing rule. And it is considerable
indeed, as Choo and Siow (2006), Galichon and Salanié (2012) and Dupuy and Galichon
(2014) show that, in a matching model with exogenous surplus, type distributions by
gender and marital status are enough to identify surplus sharing.
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2008. The BHPS allows to
match the different individuals that belong to the same household and provides individual
data on time uses. We document changes in time uses and the distributions of education,
wages and family values by gender and marital status. We estimate our model and discuss
how it makes sense of these changes. The bargaining power coefficient is estimated 0.5,
which implies that the balance of powers between spouses in the family is only function
of the outside options. We show that marriage externalities responsible for sorting in
the marriage market entirely result from tastes and not task specialization within the
household. We estimate wage elasticities of market and non market hours for both men
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and women. We find similar orders of magnitude for females as in Blundell, Dias, Meghir,
and Shaw (2015), and we are able to quantify the contribution of equilibrium changes in
marriage probabilities to the determination of these elasticities. We find that the marriage
market tends to augment the response of market hours of married individuals to male
wage increases. Following Chiappori and Meghir (2014b,a) we also estimate a monetary
measure of how much each spouse values his or her marriage in comparison to divorce.
Remarkably, we find that within-household redistribution is considerably reducing the
gender gap in welfare and within-household inequality. The correlation between male
and female wages is about 30% whereas the correlation between total equivalent incomes
is estimated 70%.
The layout of the paper is as follows. We start by describing some salient features of
intrahousehold allocation of time and matching between 1991 and 2008, that the model
is challenged to reproduce. Then we construct the matching model. The next section
develops the estimation procedure and we then show the results. Various appendices are
devoted to technical details.
2 Data
The data are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We only use
the original BHPS sample comprising 5,050 households and 9,092 adults interviewed
at wave 1 (1991), whom we then follow yearly until 2008, even after separation from
the original household.6 The panel not only follows all individuals from the first wave
(original sample members) but also all adult members of all households comprising either
an original sample member, or an individual born to an original sample member. The
sample therefore remains broadly representative of the British population (excluding
Northern Ireland and North of the Caledonian Canal) as it changes over time. We only
keep households composed of heterosexual couples (married or cohabiting) and single-
person households who are between 22 and 50 years of age at the time of interview. The
same individuals are re-interviewed in successive annual waves. To reduce non response
biases we use the individual adjustment weights provided in the survey (specifically,
Individual Respondent Weight, AXRWGHT).
We use information on usual gross pay per month for the current job, the number
of hours normally worked per week (including paid and unpaid overtime hours) and the
number of hours spent in a week doing housework (core non market work excluding
child caring and rearing, information not provided by the survey). Hourly wage is the
usual gross pay per month divided by the number of hours normally worked per month
(without overtime). Wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index and computed in
6 This survey is a stratified clustered sampling with 250 Primary Sampling Units in England, Scotland
and Wales.
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Fig. 1: Sample sizes and shares
2008 pounds.7 In order to reduce the number of labor supply corners (zero market hours
and missing wages) we replace current observations on wages and market hours by a
moving average of past, present and future observations. Specifically, suppose that we
observe wages w1, w2, ... and hours h1, h2, ... We replace wt and ht by
ŵt =
∑+∞
τ=−∞wt+τ1{ht+τ 6= 0}φ (τ/k)∑+∞
τ=−∞ 1{ht+τ 6= 0}φ (τ/k)
, ĥt =
∑+∞
τ=−∞ ht+τφ (τ/k)∑+∞
τ=−∞ φ (τ/k)
,
where φ is the standard normal PDF and k is a smoothing parameter that we arbitrarily
choose equal to 2 (after experimenting with other choices) yielding weights 1, 0.882, 0.607,
0.325, 0.135, 0.044, 0.011 for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 years apart. Then we trim the 1% top and
bottom tails of wage and time use variables. We thus obtain an unbalanced panel of 18
years (1991-2008), whose cross-sectional sizes are displayed in Figure 1. The sample sizes
vary across years, but sample shares are remarkably stable.
We finally construct a Family Values Index (FVI) based on individuals’ responses (1:
strongly agree; 2: agree; 3: neither agree nor disagree; 4: disagree; 5: strongly disagree)
to various statements about children, marriage, cohabitation and divorce. Table 1 lists
the questions used to construct the index and displays the corresponding factor loadings
estimated by Principal Component Analysis.8 Given the signs of these loadings, our
family values index is thus a measure of conservativeness.
These nearly twenty years between 1991 and 2008 have seen some remarkable changes
in time uses by gender and marital status, as well as changes in wages, attitudes and
7 We do not detrend wages further as we use inly cross-sectional data for estimation.
8 The variable “Attendance at religious service” is coded the following way: 1: Once a wk or +;
2: At least once per month; 3: At least once per year; 4: Practically never; 5: Only weddings etc.
After 1998, the item “Cohabiting is always wrong” becomes “Cohabiting is alright”. So we change it as
“6-item_answer” to maintain coherency over the years.
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Tab. 1: Family Values Index
Question Loading
Pre-school child suffers if mother works -0.24
Family suffers if mother works full-time -0.25
Woman and family happier if she works 0.16
Husband and wife should both contribute 0.14
Full time job makes woman independent 0.12
Husband should earn, wife stay at home -0.21
Children need father as much as mother -0.05
Employers should help with childcare 0.12
Single parents are as good as couples 0.17
Adult children should care for parents -0.07
Divorce better than unhappy marriage 0.12
Attendance at religious services -0.07
Cohabiting is always wrong -0.16
Notes: The Family Values Index is a weighted sum of all responses.
The table gives each question’s weight estimated by Principal
Component Analysis.
education. We now briefly describe them.9
Figure 2 confirms well known facts about market and non market work. Married
men work more outside the home than single men (moving average including periods of
unemployment), and all men, married and single, devote the same amount of time (little)
to home production. Married women devote less time to market work and more time
to household chores than single women. Male hours are remarkably stable over time.
Education is not a key determinant for men; it is for women. Educated women work
more outside the home than inside, by comparison to less educated women. Over time,
female time use differentials by education and marital status are progressively reduced.
There are also some interesting composition changes observable in that period (Fig. 3).
All marital groups gradually tend to follow the educational norm of single men. In 1991,
about 45% of single men did not have A levels, a much lower figure than the corresponding
60% for married men and single women, and 70% for married women. By 2008 all groups
had narrowed the gap to 45%. Wages do not display the same convergence pattern, as
married people’s wages increase both in absolute terms and with respect to the wages of
singles. Men are more traditionalist than women, couples are more traditionalist than
singles, and all tend to become less traditionalist over time (both because individuals’
opinions change and because new individuals enter the panel).
Lastly, Figure 4 shows how market and non-market hours vary with one’s wage and
family values. Labor supply responses to wages are as expected. Family values strongly
9 See Ramos (2005) and Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla (2012) for a more detailed description.
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Fig. 2: Time use trends
determine the market and non-market hours of married men and women.10
3 Measuring sorting in the marriage market
It is usual to describe sorting by the cross-sectional distribution of spouses’ character-
istics in the population of married couples. However, we want to think of marriage as
the outcome of a double process of searching for potential partners and decision about
partnering. In this section we propose a statistical model to separately estimate meeting
and matching probabilities, as well as divorce rates.
10 See Fortin (2005) for a study of gender attitudes and labor market outcomes across OECD countries.
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3.1 A statistical model of marriage and divorce flows
Men and women are fully characterized by a vector of characteristics such as education,
wages and family values that we call a type. Conventionally, we shall use the index i
for male types and j for female types. Let `m(i) and `f (j) denote the density functions
of male and female types in the whole population at a given point in time (there is an
implicit indexation on time), with Lm =
´
`m(i) di and Lf =
´
`f (j) dj denoting the
total numbers of men and women in the population. Let nm(i), nf (j), Nm, Nf be the
corresponding notations for the sub-populations of single men and women. Lastly, let
m(i, j) and M =
˜
m(i, j) di dj denote the density function and the total number of
couples’ types.
Assume that only singles search, ruling out search during marriage. Let λm and λf
denote the rates at which male and female singles meet other singles per unit of time.
The number of males meeting a female (λmNm) is equal to the number of females meeting
a male (λfNf ). Hence, let λ = λm/Nf = λf/Nm. As NmNf is the number of possible
matches and λNmNf is the number of meetings, λ is the rate at which potential meetings
are actualized.
We can then define marriage flows as follows. Let αij denote the probability of mar-
riage for a male of type i meeting a female of type j. The number of new marriages (or
cohabitations) of type (i, j) per unit of time is
MF (i, j) = nm(i)λm
nf (j)
Nf
αij = nf (j)λf
nm(i)
Nm
αij = λnm(i)nf (j)αij. (3.1)
We observe the flows MF (i, j) and the stocks nm(i), nf (j). We are thus faced with the
usual inference problem: How can one disentangle λ from αij?
Our solution proceeds from linking marriage and divorce flows by a common mech-
anism. Assume that there is a match-specific value z that is drawn from a distribution
G and revealed to singles when they meet for the first time. The probability of marriage
can now be thought of as the probability that z satisfies some matching rule given types
(i, j). We shall make this rule explicit later. For the moment it suffices to assume that a
condition for marriage to be consummated involving (i, j, z) exists. Assume further that
this match-specific component z is subject to i.i.d. shocks according to a Poisson process
with parameter δ. Divorce occurs when the last draw of z ceases to satisfy the matching
rule (with probability 1− αij). It follows that the flow of divorces per unit of time is
DF (i, j) = m(i, j) δ (1− αij). (3.2)
In this model, matches with a higher probability of marriage also have a lower probability
of divorce. Therefore, we should observe that a marriage that results from an exceptional
realization of z (love at first sight) should break faster than a marriage based on solid
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fundamentals. A more sophisticated model may have autoregressive shocks to z. It is
however not clear how this dynamics would be identified. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010)
show for example that individual wage dynamics can be perfectly fitted using a sequential
auction model with i.i.d. match-specific shocks in many ways similar to this model.
3.2 Identification and estimation
Define MR(i, j) ≡ MF (i,j)
nm(i)nf (j)
, the marriage rate (by potential match type), and DR(i, j) ≡
DF (i,j)
m(i,j)
, the divorce rate. If λ and δ are not nil, then equations (3.1) and (3.2) are equivalent
to the following ones:
MR(i, j)
λ
+
DR(i, j)
δ
= 1, (3.3)
(1− αij)MR(i, j)
λ
− αijDR(i, j)
δ
= 0. (3.4)
The parameters 1/λ and 1/δ are the average length of time separating two meetings or
two shocks to z. Under the assumption that MR(i, j) and DR(i, j) are not collinear, it is
easy to show that minimum distance estimation yields estimates for 1/λ and 1/δ equal to
the regression of the constant 1 on marriage and divorce rates, and αij is then estimated
as
αij =
δMR(i, j)
δMR(i, j) + λDR(i, j)
. (3.5)
If MF (i, j) = DF (i, j), this formula simplifies as
αij =
δm(i, j)
δm(i, j) + λnm(i)nf (j)
. (3.6)
This is the value of αij under stationarity. In fact, strict stationarity is not necessary for
the latter formula to provide a good approximation. It suffices that gross flows be large
with respect to net flows. This happens to be true whenever population distributions
move smoothly over time. This is therefore the formula that we use in practice, because
conditional flows are too imprecisely estimated.11
In practice, we consider two-year periods, say 1995 and 1996. We estimate nm(i),
nf (j) and m(i, j) (standardized by population sizes) by kernel density estimation from
the stocks of male singles, female singles and married couples in that period. We estimate
MF (i, j), DF (i, j) in the same way from the flows of new marriages and divorces in that
period (with a larger smoothing width to account for smaller sample sizes).
11 Estimates of 1/λ and 1/δ rely on flows. There is no other way. But they are more precisely estimated
than matching probabilities because the regression procedure averages over types (i, j) and smoothes out
small sample errors. Yet, in practice, to contain measurement errors on flows to its minimum, we estimate
1/λ and 1/δ from aggregate marriage and divorce flows by education.
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3.3 Estimation results on matching and divorce rates
The estimated values of meeting rates (λm, λf ) and of the rate at which shocks to the
public good occur (δ) are displayed in Figure 5. Meeting rates for singles are estimated
around 20% annual, and δ around 5% annual. There is no evidence of any marked trend.
So, in the estimation of the structural model, we shall set these rates equal to their
1991-2008 average estimates.
We then estimate matching probabilities. Table 2 displays a subset of the parameters
of the quadratic projection of estimated matching probabilities on individual character-
istics including all interaction terms, those quantifying the contributions of male-female
complementarities. Quadratic effects altogether explain 76% of the variance on average
across years, which indicates that the higher-order effects excluded from the projection
explain about a quarter of the total variance. The relative contribution of male-female
complementarities is 22% on average (the difference between the last two rows).
The parameter estimates reported in the table correspond to standardized character-
istics (i.e. divided by their standard deviations). Hence they are comparable with each
other. The predominant complementarities are related to education and family values.
The only sizable complementarities involving wages are those where male education is
interacted with female wage. There is a clear positive trend in the attractiveness of
high-educated persons, and perhaps a recent reduction in homophily by family values.
Matching by education, family values and wages show very different patterns. Figure
6 displays matching probability estimates projected in the education plane. Panel (b)
contains the same information as Panel (a), but transposed in order to emphasize existing
symmetries. Matching probabilities are symmetric in spouses’ education and there is
strong evidence of homophily. Mismatch probabilities (less than high school married
to some college) are below 30%, and about half of same-type marriage probabilities.
Lastly, high-educated individuals (i.e. with high school education or higher) increase their
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Tab. 2: Quadratic projection of matching probabilities (complementarities)
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Mean
(Educm > HS) ∗ (Educf > HS) 0.067 0.065 0.067 0.067 0.082 0.086 0.084 0.091 0.09 0.078
FV Im ∗ FV If 0.032 0.033 0.05 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.024 0.018 0.033
(Educm > HS) ∗ (Educf = HS) 0.022 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.024 0.037 0.028
(Educm = HS) ∗ (Educf > HS) 0.017 0.009 0.029 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.023
(Educm > HS) ∗ wagef 0.015 0.025 0.02 0.024 0.014 0.014 0.027 0.015 0.016 0.019
(Educm = HS) ∗ (Educf = HS) 0.024 0.024 0.031 0.021 0.018 0.003 0.009 0.01 0.011 0.017
(Educm = HS) ∗ wagef 0.015 0.024 0.005 0.01 0.014 0.012 0.01 0.015 0.019 0.014
FV Im ∗ (Educf = HS) -0.005 -0.006 -0.01 -0.008 -0.006 -0.016 -0.025 -0.017 -0.014 -0.012
FV Im ∗ wagef -0.001 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015 -0.009 -0.014 -0.013 -0.01 -0.008 -0.010
wagem ∗ (Educf > HS) 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.016 0.007
FV Im ∗ (Educf > HS) -0.004 -0.004 0 -0.008 -0.007 -0.012 -0.019 -0.01 0 -0.007
wagem ∗ (Educf = HS) 0.009 0.01 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.007
wagem ∗ wagef 0.003 0.01 0.009 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.006
wagem ∗ FV If 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005
(Educm > HS) ∗ FV If 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.003 0 0 0.004 0.003
(Educm = HS) ∗ FV If -0.004 -0.003 0 0.008 0.005 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.001
R2 (with male-female
interactions) 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.76
R2 (without) 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.64 0.63 0.56 0.54
Notes: All the variables are standardized. The R2 is calculated with male*female interaction terms and
without. The rows are ordered by decreasing order of the absolute mean value across years.
matching probability over the 1991-2008, which is consistent with previously documented
composition changes.
Figure 7 shows matching probabilities by quartiles of family values indices. Matching
probabilities are again found to be symmetric but the homophily pattern is different.
Progressive individuals (index lower than first quartile) are basically indifferent about
their partner’s attitudes. Homophily builds up with conservatism as traditional individu-
als are much more likely to marry someone sharing similar ideas about the family. More
traditional men are also more likely to marry less educated and lower wage women (see
Tab. 2).
By comparison, there is very limited sorting by spouses’ wages (Fig. 8). Matching
probabilities increase a lot with male wage, and relatively little with female wage, in
conformity with the quadratic regression results. Richer men are more attractive; female
wage matters little. There is no evidence of the pattern documented for the US by
Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015), that is “among married couples in the United
States, the distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife drops sharply
at 1/2 —where the wife starts to earn more than the husband.” British high wage women
do not seem to have a lower marriage probability.
The patterns of sorting by one spouse’s wage and the other spouse’s education are
also interesting (Fig. 9). High-wage men marry more, but high-educated men marry
less, roughly irrespective of female wage. If any, high-educated men, to a rather limited
extent, are more likely to match with higher wage women. On the other hand, although
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Fig. 6: Matching probabilities by spouses’ education
low-educated women did marry more than high-educated ones in 1991, this educational
differential has disappeared by 2008. At the same time, women are much more likely to
marry richer men, irrespective of education. Hence, there is limited positive sorting by
female wage and male education, but none by male wage and female education.
4 The economics of marriage and intrahousehold decisions
What do these documented patterns of task specialization and sorting by education,
family values and wages allow us to infer on individual preferences and the amount of
redistribution at work in the household? In order to answer this question, we need to
build a theory of marriage decision and of the allocation of resources within the household.
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Fig. 7: Matching probabilities by spouses’ family values indices
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Fig. 8: Matching probabilities by spouses’ wages
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Fig. 9: Matching probabilities by wage and education
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This is the aim of this section. We build a matching model on the equilibrium search-
bargaining model of Shimer and Smith (2000), which we enrich with labor supply and
home production decisions as in Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981).
4.1 Private preferences
Individuals draw utility from private consumption c0, whose price is normalized to one,
private leisure e, and a public good q that is produced in-house. Let Ui(c0, e, q) denote
the utility function of an individual with exogenous characteristics i. For later use, we
also define the conditional indirect utility function
ψi(R, q) = max
c0,e
Ui(c0, e, q) s.t. c0 + wie ≤ R, (4.1)
for a given income R and public good q, and where wi is the wage that is associated to
the individual type i. The demands for consumption and leisure follow from the indirect
utility function by application of Roy’s identity.
Singles have access to a household production technology that requires domestic time
as single input: q = F 0i (d). For married couples, the home production inputs are the
hours spent on domestic chores by both spouses (dm, df ) and some expenditure c.12 This
additional expenditure c may capture children’s consumption although we abstract from
modeling fertility. Domestic production for couples varies by spouses’ types (i, j) and a
match-specific scale z as q = zF 1ij(c, dm, df ). The match-specific component z is drawn
from a distribution G at the time of first meeting and is infrequently updated, with
independent draws from the same distribution G accruing at random times according to
a Poisson process with parameter δ.
We normalize to one the total amount of time available per week to any individual. So
market hours is h ≡ 1−e−d, and wi is both the wage rate and the total income available
to the individual, to be shared between market work, non-market work and leisure. In
this paper, we only consider interior solutions with 1 > e, d, h > 0.
For a single of type i, income R in equation (4.1) is equal to wi(1− d). For a married
couple of male-female type (i, j), we need to allow for the possibility of transfers between
spouses and for funding of the home production expenditure c. We therefore introduce
intra-household “taxes” on private consumption tm, tf such that
c0m + wiem = wi(1− dm)− tm ≡ Rm, c0f + wjef = wj(1− df )− tf ≡ Rf .
12 We do not observe home production expenditure. A home production function for singles of the
form q = F 0i (c, d) would not be identifiable. We shall show that we can afford this extension for married
couples.
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The household budget is balanced if c0m + c0f + c = wihm + wjhf , which implies that
c = tm + tf .
4.2 Marriage contracts
Assuming that individuals do not make long term commitments and can walk away from
the negotiation at any time, a marriage contract between a male of type i and a female of
type j, for a current match-specific shock z, specifies a utility level for both spouses, um
and uf , and two promised continuation values, V 1m(z′) and V 1f (z′), for any realization z′
of the next match-specific shock. Let V 0i and V 0j denote the equilibrium values of being
single for type-i men, and type-j women.
Let Wm and Wf denote the present value of a marriage contract for any given choice
of (um, uf , V 1m, V 1f ). The marriage contract values are related to the values of singlehood
by the following option-value equation:
rWm = um + δ
ˆ [
max
{
V 0i , V
1
m(z
′)
}−Wm] dG(z′), (4.2)
where r is the discount rate and the second term of the right-hand side is the option value
of divorce after a shock to the match-specific component.
Marriage utilities um, uf depend on controls c, dm, df , tm, tf as
um = ψi [wi(1− dm)− tm, q] , uf = ψj [wj(1− df )− tf , q] , q = zF 1ij(c, dm, df ), (4.3)
and these controls are chosen so as to maximize the Nash bargaining criterion
max
c,dm,df ,tm,tf
[
Wm − V 0i
]β [
Wf − V 0j
]1−β
, (4.4)
subject to the feasibility constraint c = tm + tf .
Finally, without commitment, the promise-keeping constraint imposes that Wm =
V 1m(z). Hence,
(r + δ)
[
V 1m(z)− V 0i
]
= um + δ
ˆ [
V 1m(z
′)− V 0i
]+
dG(z′)− rV 0i , (4.5)
denoting x+ ≡ max{x, 0} and with a symmetric expression for V 1f (z).13 Note that the
equilibrium value of a marriage contract between spouses is a function of types i, j and z.
We shall use the notation V 1m(i, j, z), V 1f (i, j, z) whenever necessary to make precise the
dependence of i, j.
13 Notice that the solution to the bargaining problem in c, dm, df , tm, tf is invariant to an affine change of
indirect utility functions (ψi, ψj) into (ai+biψi, aj+bjψj). Utilities um, uf and flow values rV 1m(z), rV 1f (z)
are then subject to the same affine changes.
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The matching probability is the probability that the participation constraint holds at
the current value of (i, j, z), that is
αij = Pr{V 1m(z)− V 0i ≥ 0 and V 1f (z)− V 0j ≥ 0}.
4.3 The value of being single
The present value of singlehood follows as
rV 0i = max
d
ψi[wi(1− d), F 0i (d)]
+ λ
¨ [
V 1m(i, j, z)− V 0i
]+
1{V 1j (i, j, z)− V 0j > 0}dG(z) n̂f (j) dj, (4.6)
where n̂f (j) denotes singles’ expectations about type distributions in the future. Single
individuals have indeed to forecast their chances of meeting a partner of any type. Assum-
ing that the economy is in a steady state easily solves the expectation formation problem.
Any alternative solution would make the model tremendously more complicated.
4.4 Steady state
In steady state, flows in and out of the stocks of married couples of each type must exactly
balance each other out. This means that, for all (i, j),
δ (1− αij)m(i, j) = λnm(i)nf (j)αij. (4.7)
The left-hand side is the flow of divorces. The right-hand side is the flow of new (i, j)-
marriages. It has three components: a single male of type i, out of the nm(i) identical
ones, meets a single female with probability λNf ; this woman is of type j with probability
nf (j)/Nf ; the marriage is consummated with probability αij.
Now, making use of the accounting restrictions,
`m(i) = nm(i) +
ˆ
m(i, j) dj, `f (j) = nf (j) +
ˆ
m(i, j) di,
and replacing m(i, j) by its value from (4.7), i.e. m(i, j) = λ
δ
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j)nm(i)nf (j), the
equilibrium measures of singles, nm(i), nf (j), are solutions to the following fixed-point
system:
nm(i) =
`m(i)
1 + λ
δ
´
nf (j)
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j) dj
, nf (j) =
`f (j)
1 + λ
δ
´
nm(i)
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j) di
. (4.8)
Note that λ may be an endogenous parameter, function of the aggregate numbers
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of singles Nm and Nf , say λ(Nm, Nf ). With quadratic returns, as in Shimer and Smith
(2000), λ is constant. But a more reasonable assumption may be constant returns to scale
in the meeting function λNmNf , for example Cobb-Douglas. In this case, this dependence
has to be incorporated into the equilibrium equations.
5 Equilibrium solution with transferable utility
We assume that the indirect utility is of the quasi-linear form
ψi(R, q) = q
R− Ai
Bi
, (5.1)
where Ai ≡ Ai(wi) and Bi ≡ Bi(wi) are differentiable, non-decreasing and concave func-
tions of the wage wi and other individual characteristics such as gender and education.
We also normalize the denominator as Bi(1) = 1.
We show in Appendix A that under this assumption the equilibrium satisfies the
following two properties:
1. Separability. Domestic production inputs are determined independently of
transfers and continuation values.
2. Transferability. There exists a match surplus Sij(z) that is shared between
spouses, and matching requires positive surplus.
5.1 Separability
The first order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem with respect to domestic pro-
duction are
1
wi
∂ lnF 1ij(c, dm, df )
∂dm
=
1
wj
∂ lnF 1ij(c, dm, df )
∂df
=
∂ lnF 1ij(c, dm, df )
∂c
=
1
X
where X ≡ wi(1−dm)−Ai+wj(1−df )−Aj− c is the net total private expenditure, that
is what is left of total income wi + wj to be spent on private consumption and leisure,
after spending wid1m + wjd1f + c on home production, above and beyond the minimal
expenditures Ai + Aj.
These conditions deliver three functions c(i, j), d1m(i, j), d1f (i, j) of observable match
characteristics.14 Let then Xij denote the equilibrium value of X,
Xij = wi[1− d1m(i, j)]− Ai + wj[1− d1f (i, j)]− Aj − c(i, j), (5.2)
14 These demand functions are independent of z because the production function for couples is propor-
tional to z. This is a simplifying condition that is not essential for separability.
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and let
Qij ≡ F 1ij
(
c(i, j), d1m(i, j), d
1
f (i, j)
)
Xij. (5.3)
The function zQij of (i, j, z) is the equilibrium value of the aggregate per-period welfare
of the household, um + uf .
5.2 Transferability
In Appendix A, we show that the first-order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem
with respect to transfers yield the restrictions
(r + δ)Bi
[
V 1m(z)− V 0i
]
= βSij(z), (r + δ)Bj
[
V 1f (z)− V 0j
]
= (1− β)Sij(z), (5.4)
and the match surplus Sij(z) solves
Sij(z) = zQij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j +
δ
r + δ
Sij, (5.5)
where Sij ≡
´
Sij(z
′)+ dG(z′) is the integrated surplus.
Let G(s) ≡ ´ (z−s)+ dG(z) = ´ +∞
s
z dG(z)−s[1−G(s)]. The function G is decreasing
and invertible on the support of G (with G ′ = −(1−G)). We show that Sij solves
Sij = QijG
(
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j − δr+δSij
Qij
)
, (5.6)
and equation (4.6) becomes
BirV
0
i = Biψ
0
i +
λβ
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnf (j) dj, BjrV
0
j = Bjψ
0
j +
λ(1− β)
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnm(i) di, (5.7)
respectively for single men and women.
A match (i, j, z) is consummated if Sij(z) ≥ 0, and the matching probability is
αij = Pr{Sij(z) > 0} = 1−G
[
G−1
(
Sij
Qij
)]
. (5.8)
Lastly, equilibrium transfers, tm(i, j, z) and tf (i, j, z), are a way of sharing net total
private expenditure Xij:
wi(1− d1m)− tm − Ai = βij(z)Xij, wj(1− d1f )− tf − Aj = [1− βij(z)]Xij, (5.9)
where
βij(z) = β +
1
z
(1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
Qij
. (5.10)
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(Note that indirect utility can be negative.)
5.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is fully characterized by the following functions of individual types,
Sij, BirV
0
i , BjrV
0
j , nm(i), nf (j). They are obtained by iterating the fixed-point operator
defined by equations (4.8), (5.6), (5.7), using (5.8) for αij and with Nm =
´
nm(i) di and
Nf =
´
nf (j) dj. Proving equilibrium existence is difficult (possibly by application of
Schauder fixed point theorem as in Shimer and Smith, 2000) and the equilibrium is likely
not unique.15
6 Specification and estimation
In this section we specify parametrically the utility functions and the production func-
tions, and explain how we let them depend on individual types. Then, we develop the
constructive identification/estimation procedure. Finally, we comment on goodness of fit
and parameter estimates.
6.1 Parametric specification
The way parameters depend on exogenous variables (gender gi, education Edi, wage
wi and family values index xi) is specified as follows. We allow private preferences to
depend on gender, education and wages, but not on the family values index. Domestic
production depends on gender, education and family values but not on wages. We assume
that once domestic production has been collectively chosen, the private trade-off between
consumption and leisure does not depend on the family values index. We make this
exclusion restriction to introduce a source of independent variation in housework hours.
This is not strictly necessary for identification as we shall see in the next subsection on
identification.
Preferences. The indirect utility for consumption and leisure is a smooth function of
gender and wage with
Ai = −a0g(Edi)
bg
+
a1g
1− bgwi +
a2g
2− bgw
2
i , lnBi ≡ bg lnwi, gi = g ∈ {m, f}, (6.1)
with a0g(Edi) = a0gH or a0gL, depending on the education indicator Edi ∈ {H,L}, where
L refers to high school dropout or vocational and H to higher education (high school and
15 In order to calculate a fixed point x = Tx it is often useful, if the operator is not contracting, to use
iterations of the form: xn+1 = k Txn + (1 − k)xn, with 0 < k < 1. In our experiments, this algorithm
always converged fast to a single equilibrium.
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higher). The demand for leisure is thus
wiei = a0g(Edi) + a1gwi + a2gw
2
i + bgRi, Ri = wi(1− di)− ti, (6.2)
given domestic time di and transfer ti (ti = 0 for singles).
Domestic production. The domestic production functions are Stone-Geary:
[couples] F 1ij(c, dm, df ) = Zij (c− Cij)Kc
(
dm −D1i
)K1m (df −D1j)K1f , (6.3)
[singles] F 0i (d) = (d−D0i )K
0
i . (6.4)
Note the absence of TFP parameter in front of the home production for singles. This is
a normalizing constraint that is rendered necessary by the ordinal nature of preferences.
Choo and Siow (2006), Galichon and Salanié (2012) make a similar assumption. The
time used in home production is therefore – for singles
d0 = D0i +
K0i
1+K0i
(
1−D0i − Ai/wi
)
, (6.5)
and for couples,
d1m = D
1
i +K
1
mXij/wi, d
1
f = D
1
j +K
1
fXij/wj, c = Cij +KcXij, (6.6)
with net total private expenditure (see equation (5.2)) being
Xij =
wi(1−D1i ) + wj(1−D1j )− Cij − Ai − Aj
1 +K1c +K
1
i +K
1
j
. (6.7)
The equilibrium domestic productions are, for singles,
F 0i (d
0) =
[
K0i
1+K0i
(
1−D0i − Ai/wi
)]K0i
, (6.8)
and for couples,
F 1ij(c, d
1
m, d
1
f ) = Zij
(
K1c
)K1c (K1i
wi
)K1i (K1j
wj
)K1j
X
K1c+K
1
i +K
1
j
ij . (6.9)
This specification is quite flexible. Suppose that some factor increases D1j . Then the
wife will increase her non-market hours and her husband will reduce his input to home
production. Minimal inputs (D1i , D1j ) thus govern home-production specialization. At
the same time, increasing D1j reduces Xij, hence output F 1ij(c, d1m, d1f ). It is therefore
important to allow the factors determining minimal inputs to determine public good
quality Zij (home production TFP) at the same time.
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Hence, we specify minimal inputs as
D0i ≡ D0g(Edi, xi) = δ00g(Edi) + δ01gxi, K0i = K0g , gi = g ∈ {m, f}, (6.10)
with δ00g(Ed) = δ00gH or δ00gL, for Ed ∈ {H,L}, and
D1i = D
1
m(Edi, xi) = δ
1
0m(Edi) + δ
1
1mxi, K
1
i = K
1
m, (6.11)
D1j = D
1
f (Edj, xj) = δ
1
0f (Edj) + δ
1
1fxj, K
1
j = K
1
f , (6.12)
with δ10g(Ed) = δ10gH or δ10gL, g ∈ {m, f}. We also specify Cij with no interactions between
spouses’ types:
Cij ≡ C + cmH1(Edi = H) + cfH1(Edj = H) + c1mxi + c1fxj, (6.13)
where C, cmH , cfH , c1m, c1f are 5 scalar parameters and 1(Edi = H) is equal to 1 if
Edi = H and 0 otherwise. Lastly, public good quality Zij is a general function of both
spouses’ characteristics:
Zij ≡ Z(Edi, wi, xi, Edj, wj, xj), (6.14)
that will be estimated non-parametrically as indicated below. As already indicated, it
is important that education and family values, which determine minimal inputs, also
determine Zij. We also let Zij depend on wages and on interactions between male and
female factors. This will allow us to estimate the source of marriage externalities that is
not already accounted for by task-sharing.
Lastly, the distribution of match-specific shocks z is log-normal: G(z) = Φ(ln(z)/σz),
where Φ is the standard normal cdf and σz is the standard deviation of z.16
6.2 Identification
Although identification may hold under far less restrictive assumptions, we only discuss
identification under the preceding parametric restrictions.
First consider singles’ demand for leisure, which equation (6.2) tells us that it depends
on education, wage and home production time as
wie
0 = a0g(Edi) + a1gwi + a2gw
2
i + bgwi(1− d0). (6.15)
This equation is identified if there is exogenous variation in non market time d0, which is
16 We then have
G(s) = −sΦ
(
− ln s
σz
)
+ e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
− ln s
σz
+ σz
)
.
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the case if d0 varies with family values. If non market hours d0 do not exhibit independent
variation, then a1g + bg is identified but not a1g and bg separately. This is the usual
identification issue with labor supply models. They are not identified unless a source of
non-earned income is observed.
Next, consider married couples. The leisure equation (6.2) together with equations
(5.9), (5.10) for transfers implies that
wie
1
m =
a1m
1− bmwi +
2a2m
2− bmw
2
i + bmβij(z)Xij, (6.16)
wje
1
f =
a1f
1− bf wj +
2a2f
2− bf w
2
j + bf [1− βij(z)]Xij. (6.17)
The sharing rule βij(z) depends on structural parameters and characteristics, wages in
particular, in a complicated, nonlinear way. One can remove the dependency of βij(z) on
z by averaging. However, the potential link between βij(z) and wages makes it unlikely
that these two equations suffice to identify preference parameters. If βij(z) does not vary
with wages, then it is easy to see that equations (6.15) and (6.16), (6.17) together identify
preference parameters.17
However, adding up equations (6.16) and (6.17) yields
wi
bm
(
e1m −
a1m
1− bm −
2a2m
2− bmwi
)
+
wj
bf
(
e1f −
a1f
1− bf −
2a2f
2− bf wj
)
= Xij. (6.18)
Then, identification of the home production function for couples and parameters bm, bf
follows from the demand equations
d1m = D
1
i +K
1
mXij/wi, d
1
f = D
1
j +K
1
fXij/wj.
As D1i and D1j do not depend on wages, it is easy to see that differentiating d1m and d1f
with respect to wages wi, wj delivers plenty of identifying restrictions. For example,
∂wid
1
m
∂wi
= D1i +K
1
m
[
1
bm
(
∂wie
1
m
∂wi
− a1m
1− bm −
4a2m
2− bmwi
)
+
1
bf
∂wje
1
f
∂wi
]
suffices to identifyK1m, bm, bf . The remaining parameters of the home-production function
follow from the equilibrium value of Xij:
Xij =
wi(1−D1i ) + wj(1−D1j )− Cij − Ai − Aj
1 +K1c +K
1
m +K
1
f
.
Finally, we show in Appendix B that values Sij, V 0i , V 0j are uniquely obtained from
17 Differentiate equations (6.16), (6.17) with respect to wages and eliminate all dependency to βij(z)
and Xij .
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matching probabilities αij given the other parameters, i.e. those already identified, β
(bargaining power parameter) and σz (standard deviation of the match shock z). This
inversion result is similar, though different, to the argument in Choo and Siow (2006),
Galichon and Salanié (2012) for static, competitive matching models. This type of in-
version argument is common to many decision and equilibrium models.18 It allows to
identify β and σz from the first- and second-order moments of private leisure e1m, e1f (or
market time). Note that we already used wie1m/bm + wje1f/bf to identify Xij and the
home production function for couples. Parameter β is thus identified by the way this
sum is shared between spouses. Then σz is identified from the residual dispersion of
leisure expenditures conditional on observed types.
6.3 Estimation strategy
Let us consider one two-year cross-section of household data on time uses, gender, wages,
family values and education. We use couples of years to increase sample size. The index i
now refers to an observation unit of the sample of male singles, j refers to female singles,
and (i, j) refers to couples. For singles, we observe domestic time use d0i , labor supply
h0i and education Edi ∈ {L,H}, wages wi and family values indices xi. For couples, the
corresponding time use observations are d1mij, d1fij, h1mij and h1fij. Leisure is e = 1− d−h.
The estimation procedure is iterative and goes through the following steps.
1. Estimate λ, δ, αij as indicated in Section 3 from nonparametric estimates of stock
densities nm(i), nf (j),m(i, j) and corresponding flows. In practice we smooth out
fluctuations in λ, δ by taking the average over all two-year cross-sections.
2. Given a value for σz, estimate the parameters of preferences and domestic produc-
tions, as well as bargaining power β, by two-stage GMM19 based on the following
residuals and instruments:
(a) For single men, the residuals are
u0i =
(
d0i −D0m(Edi, xi)− K
0
m
1+K0m
[1−D0m(Edi, xi)− Ai/wi]
e0i − a0m(Edi)/wi − a1m − a2mwi − bm(1− d0i )
)
,
with a similar expression for single women. The instruments are
ξi = (1,1(Edi = H), xi, wi,1(Edi = H)/wi) .
This is the way the exogenous characteristics condition the residuals.
18 See e.g. Hotz and Miller (1993), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong
(1995), and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999, 2000).
19 First with metric equal to the identity matrix and second with metric equal to the diagonal of the
inverse of variance-covariance matrix of moments.
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(b) For couples, the residuals are
u1ij =

d1mij −D1m(Edi, xi)−K1mXij/wi
d1fij −D1f (Edj, xj)−K1fXij/wj
e1mij − a1m1−bm − 2a2m2−bmwi − bmβijXij/wi
e1fij − a1f1−bf −
2a2f
2−bfwj − bf (1− βij)Xij/wj
 ,
with
Xij =
wi[1−D1m(Edi, xi)] + wj[1−D1f (Edj, xj)]− Cij − Ai − Aj
1 +K1c +K
1
m +K
1
m
,
βij = β + E
(
1
z
|z ≥ G−1(1− αij)
)
(1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
Qij
.
The instruments are ξi ⊗ ξj.20 The leisure residuals follow from equations
(6.16), (6.17), (5.9), after taking the expectation with respect to z.21 We
back out Sij, BirV 0i , BjrV 0j and Qij from matching probabilities αij, given
type densities nm(i), nf (j) and the other parameters, by solving a fixed-point
system similar to the equilibrium system in Section 5. See Appendix B.2 for
details.
3. Estimate σz by fitting the variance-covariance matrix of market hours for couples.
See Appendix B.3 for details. Then repeat steps 2 and 3 until numerical conver-
gence. This simple iterative procedure worked in our case although there is no
guaranty that it would always converge.
4. Lastly, estimate public good quality Zij from equation (5.3):
Zij = Qij
[(
K1c
)K1c (K1i
wi
)K1i (K1j
wj
)K1j
X
1+K1c+K
1
i +K
1
j
ij
]−1
.
Once the model has been estimated, an economy can be simulated by computing the
equilibrium as indicated in Section 5. Specifically, for every two-year cross section, given
estimated parameters and the observed distributions of male and female types in the
population (i.e. `m(i), `f (j)), we use the equilibrium fixed point to calculate conditional
distributions nm(i), nf (j),m(i, j) together with values Sij, BirV 0i , BjrV 0j . This is what
we have to do, in particular, to evaluate the goodness of fit of the model.
Finally, individual types comprise one continuous variable, the wage, and the family
values index is approximately continuous as it is constructed by aggregation of many
20 Many interaction terms can be omitted without prejudice.
21 Note that E
(
1
z |z > s
)
= e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
− ln sσz − σz
)
/Φ
(
− ln sσz
)
for z ∼ LN (0, σ2z), and that marriage is
consummated if z ≥ G−1(1− αij) for the marriage probability to be equal to αij .
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discrete variables. Hence, functions Sij, BirV 0i , BjrV 0j , nm(i), nf (j), m(i, j) have to be
discretized and integrals in equilibrium operators have to be approximated. We rely for
that on Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature and Chebyshev polynomials (see Trefethen, 2013).
These numerical techniques allow to approximate functions and to operate on these ap-
proximations (differentiation, integration, interpolation) in a very economical way as far
as memory storage is concerned.22
6.4 Fit
Fitting the distributions of types (i.e. education, wages and family values indices), and
the functional links between market and non-market hours and types, by gender and
marital status, and how they change over time, represented a significant challenge that
our simple model tackled brilliantly. Figure 10 shows how the model fits the numbers of
single men and women over time, and the fit of time trends for market and non-market
hours. We tried the simulations both with a quadratic meeting function (λ constant) and
with a linearly homogenous one. Surprisingly enough, the fit was slightly better with λ
constant. An online appendix contains figures and tables for the fit of the distributions
of wages and family values indices for all cross-sections, as well as conditional means of
market and non market hours and matching probabilities. The fit is good for all 9 cross
sections.
6.5 Parameter estimates
We now comment on some parameter estimates, which are all displayed in Table 3.
The bargaining power parameter β is estimated close to 0.5, which is good news as it
indicates that rent sharing is determined by outside options and not by the generalized
Nash bargaining parameter. The (log) match-specific shock has an estimated standard
error that is estimated around 1/3, which is far from negligible. This implies that it
moves public good quality in a plus-or-minus-50% range with 95% probability.
We will return to the discussion of public good estimates and the effect of wages
in the following sections. The most striking difference between men and women, as
far as home production is concerned, is found in the parameter of the family values
index conditioning the level of non-market time of couples (δ1m and δ1f ). In the early
1990s, traditional married women devoted much more time to home production than
progressive women, and the opposite was true for men. This very strong link between
non-market time and the family values index was greatly attenuated by the end of the
period. Moreover, family values have little impact on home production for singles. We
22 For example, evaluating a smooth bounded function f on a bounded interval at 11 Chebishev points
(including the two extreme bounds) is like approximating this function by a 10th-order polynomial. (See
Appendix C for details.)
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Fig. 10: Fit
also find that education is discriminating for females but not for males; low-educated
women are willing to spend more time in home production tasks, whatever the marriage
status, and this gender-education differential is stable over time.
7 Sorting
The fit of marriage probabilities is very good because of the one-to-one relationship
between marriage probability and public good quality Zij. If we project the estimated
lnZij on spouses’ types and their interactions, we find very similar estimates than for the
quadratic projection of matching probabilities displayed in Table 2. So we do not report
them.
Table 4 shows the R2 of the regression of the actual matching probabilities (assigned
to every couple in the sample)23 on the equilibrium matching probabilities predicted using
23 More precisely we calculate R2 = 1−Var(u)/Var(y), where u = y − ŷ.
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Tab. 4: Fit of matching probabilities
Year 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Mean
Nonparametric estimation of Zij
R2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Quadratic projection of lnZij
R2 0.71 0.77 0.81 0.55 0.79 0.79 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.76
Quadratic projection of lnZij without interactions
R2 0.41 0.30 0.45 0.51 0.26 0.38 0.64 0.37 0.56 0.43
1995 2000 2005
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Husband, <HS
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0.4
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Husband, >HS
Wife, <HS Wife, HS Wife, >HS
Fig. 11: Matching probabilities by spouses’ education with no spouse complementarities
in public good quality (Counterfactual for Fig. 6(a))
the nonparametric estimates of Zij (perfect because of the one-to-one binding function),
the regression on the marriage probabilities predicted by the quadratic projection of the
nonparametric estimates of lnZij, and finally the regression on the probabilities predicted
by the same quadratic projection without male-female interaction terms. By using the
quadratic approximation the fit is reduced by about 25%. Removing male-female com-
plementarities reduces the fit further by 33%. Therefore the contribution of male-female
complementarities in public good quality may account for about 43% (= 1− 0.43
0.76
) of the
total variance of marriage probabilities.
The next question is how much of the actual sorting that we described in Section
3 is explained by the model without interaction terms in public good quality? Put in
another way, how much sorting is explained by task sharing vis-à-vis preferences? The
answer is none. We just give here one example by showing the matching probabilities
by husband and wife education that are predicted without spouse complementarities in
Zij (Fig. 11). The same differences across female education groups can be observed for
all male education groups. All homophily by education is gone. We have put in the
web appendix the other sorting patterns that we commented in Section 3. There is no
sorting left, neither positive (homophily) nor negative (specialization). Hence, our model
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predicts that one does not marry in anticipation of gains from specialization, but because
birds of a feather flock together. This confirms the argument developed by Stevenson
and Wolfers (2007) that “reduced market discrimination and technological advances [...]
reduce the benefits from specialization of spouses in the home and market spheres, thereby
decreasing the gains from marriage. However, increasing leisure time and wealth, along
with the changing landscape defining sexual relations, potentially raise the gains from
consumption complementarities.”
8 Wage elasticities
In order to interpret preference parameter estimates we calculate wage elasticities. We
increase all wages in the 1999-2000 sample by 10%, separately for men and women, and
simulate changes in market and non market hours. We first run the simulations with
unchanged individual expectations of the distributions of individual types by gender and
marital status, and then we simulate the complete new equilibrium including distribu-
tional changes.
The results are reported in Table 5. The first column displays the actual average hours.
The second column displays the average simulated hours for the estimated parameters
(baseline). There are small discrepancies between actual and baseline numbers as the fit,
though good, is not perfect. Then we show the changes in hours at the new equilibrium,
and finally using baseline distributions instead of the equilibrium ones. In the literature,
estimates of uncompensated or Marshallian elasticities vary a lot across publications (see
Blundell and Macurdy, 1999, Meghir and Phillips, 2008). Our estimates of female own-
wage labor supply elasticities (0.32 and 0.26 for married and single women) are similar
to the estimates in the recent work of Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2015), which is
a dynamic labor supply model for female workers. The elasticity of participation rates
(extensive margin) is estimated 0.47 and the elasticity of hours worked (intensive margin)
is estimated 0.22.
We also find that married and low-educated women have larger elasticities than single
and high-educated women. Male elasticities are lower than female elasticities, but the
gap is smaller for singles than for married individuals. Education does not seem to play a
large role for men. We also calculate the elasticities of domestic hours. For married men,
non market hours respond to wage changes more than market hours. For married women,
the opposite is true. Single men do not reduce further the already small amount of time
devoted to home chores. Single women reduce non market hours in similar proportion
as they increase market hours. Cross effects (e.g. male wage on female labor supply)
are much smaller. Married women, especially if non educated, yet reduce labor supply
significantly after an exogenous increase in male wages.
Finally we comment on the consequences of endogenizing marriage formation on the
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Tab. 5: Wage elasticities of hours – 1999-2000
Baseline Equilibrium distributions Fixed distributions
Actual simulation ∆wm
wm
= 10%
∆wf
wf
= 10% ∆wm
wm
= 10%
∆wf
wf
= 10%
Working hours
Married men 43.36 43.04 43.72 1.6% 42.79 -0.6% 43.41 0.9% 42.58 -1.1%
Single men 37.28 37.04 37.75 1.9% 37.01 -0.1% 37.72 1.8% 37.00 -0.1%
Married women 26.19 25.29 24.81 -1.9% 26.10 3.2% 25.11 -0.7% 26.28 3.9%
Single women 29.63 29.01 28.97 -0.1% 29.78 2.6% 29.02 0.0% 29.76 2.6%
Domestic hours
Married men 5.24 5.30 5.16 -2.5% 5.37 1.3% 5.17 -2.5% 5.39 1.7%
Single men 5.15 5.16 5.16 0.0% 5.17 0.1% 5.15 -0.2% 5.15 -0.2%
Married Women 15.58 15.72 15.84 0.7% 15.55 -1.1% 15.84 0.7% 15.53 -1.2%
Single Women 10.31 10.42 10.43 0.2% 10.19 -2.1% 10.40 -0.1% 10.18 -2.2%
Working hours by education level
Married men <HS 44.28 43.91 44.59 1.5% 43.64 -0.6% 44.27 0.8% 43.43 -1.1%
Married men HS 42.79 41.57 42.37 1.9% 41.31 -0.6% 42.04 1.1% 41.10 -1.1%
Married men > HS 42.44 42.99 43.55 1.3% 42.80 -0.4% 43.27 0.7% 42.59 -0.9%
Single men <HS 37.62 37.37 38.09 1.9% 37.36 0.0% 38.05 1.8% 37.34 -0.1%
Single men HS 38.69 35.50 36.35 2.4% 35.48 -0.1% 36.33 2.4% 35.47 -0.1%
Single men >HS 35.50 37.95 38.52 1.5% 37.89 -0.2% 38.51 1.5% 37.90 -0.1%
Married women <HS 23.91 22.91 22.38 -2.3% 23.84 4.1% 22.73 -0.8% 24.07 5.0%
Married women HS 27.44 26.63 26.17 -1.7% 27.49 3.2% 26.46 -0.6% 27.68 3.9%
Married women > HS 30.15 29.49 29.09 -1.4% 30.05 1.9% 29.40 -0.3% 30.18 2.3%
Single women <HS 27.60 26.88 26.85 -0.1% 27.79 3.4% 26.88 0.0% 27.72 3.2%
Single women HS 31.66 29.93 29.89 -0.1% 30.77 2.8% 29.95 0.0% 30.73 2.7%
Single women >HS 31.41 31.85 31.83 -0.1% 32.41 1.7% 31.86 0.0% 32.43 1.8%
Domestic hours by education level
Married men <HS 5.06 5.07 4.93 -2.8% 5.14 1.5% 4.93 -2.8% 5.16 1.8%
Married men HS 5.28 5.64 5.49 -2.7% 5.71 1.2% 5.49 -2.6% 5.73 1.6%
Married men > HS 5.47 5.36 5.25 -2.1% 5.41 0.9% 5.25 -2.0% 5.45 1.7%
Single men <HS 5.17 5.21 5.21 0.0% 5.21 0.1% 5.20 -0.1% 5.20 -0.1%
Single men HS 5.24 5.10 5.10 0.0% 5.11 0.1% 5.09 -0.2% 5.10 -0.2%
Single men >HS 5.03 5.15 5.15 0.1% 5.15 0.0% 5.14 -0.2% 5.14 -0.2%
Married women <HS 17.38 17.69 17.83 0.8% 17.49 -1.1% 17.81 0.7% 17.46 -1.3%
Married women HS 14.51 13.75 13.86 0.8% 13.57 -1.3% 13.87 0.8% 13.54 -1.5%
Married women > HS 12.54 13.05 13.16 0.8% 12.90 -1.2% 13.11 0.5% 12.87 -1.4%
Single women <HS 12.46 12.49 12.50 0.1% 12.22 -2.2% 12.48 -0.1% 12.23 -2.1%
Single women HS 9.17 8.76 8.77 0.1% 8.50 -2.9% 8.75 -0.1% 8.51 -2.9%
Single women >HS 7.66 8.20 8.21 0.1% 8.02 -2.2% 8.20 -0.1% 8.00 -2.5%
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Tab. 6: Wage elasticities of matching probabilities – 1999-2000
Baseline Equilibrium distributions
Actual simulation ∆wm
wm
= 10%
∆wf
wf
= 10%
Number of single men 978 1026 989 -3.6% 1031.00 0.5%
Number of single women 984 1001 976 -2.5% 989.00 -1.2%
Number of couples 2505 2390 2416 1.1% 2386.00 -0.2%
Matching probabilities of men by education level
< HS 0.40 0.39 0.40 2.8% 0.39 -0.9%
HS 0.38 0.37 0.38 3.2% 0.37 -0.2%
> HS 0.28 0.28 0.29 3.7% 0.28 0.4%
Matching probabilities of women by education level
< HS 0.39 0.38 0.39 2.6% 0.38 -0.6%
HS 0.37 0.36 0.38 3.0% 0.36 -0.8%
> HS 0.28 0.27 0.29 4.7% 0.27 0.6%
wage elasticities of hours. A difference is only visible for married couples and only for
market hours. The response of male and female labor supply to an increase in male wage
is stronger in the general equilibrium case. The response of male and female market
hours to an increase in female wage is weaker. To understand why, we display in Table 6
the effects of a wage increase on matching probabilities. The only noticeable effect is for
male wages, where a 10% wage rise increases matching probabilities by 0.3-0.4 percentage
points, and there are about 3% fewer singles. A wage rise renders males more attractive
in the marriage market; there are more marriages and increased specialization in paid
work for men and housework for women.
9 Quantifying the individual value of marriage
In this section we develop a way of measuring marriage externalities and apply it to the
estimated model.
9.1 The willingness to pay for marriage
Following Chiappori and Meghir (2014a,b), we quantify the value of marriage in the
tradition of public economics as follows. Let us first extend the definition of the value for
singles as
V 0i (µ) ≡ max
d
ψi
[
wi(1− d) + µ, F 0i (d)
]
+ λ
¨ [
V 1m(i, j, z)− V 0i (µ)
]+
dG(z)nf (j) dj,
for some non-earned income µ paid to singles until marriage. The Total Equivalent Income
Ii (resp. Ij) is the total income wi + µm (resp. wj + µf ) that makes a married individual
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indifferent between remaining married at the current contract or becoming single with
the income supplement µm (resp. µf ).24 Note that Chiappori and Meghir’s framework is
static. It makes sense, in a dynamic environment, to assume that the bachelor subsidy
(µm, µf ) is lost when a new marriage occurs.
For a man of type i, we thus define µm(i, j, z) as the solution to V 0i (µm) = V 1m(i, j, z),
that is, µm(i, j, z) solves
max
d
ψi
[
wi(1− d) + µm, F 0i (d)
]
= V 1m(i, j, z)
− λ
¨ [
V 1m(i, j, z
′)− V 1m(i, j, z)
]+
dG(z′)nf (j′) dj′. (9.1)
With a similar expression for female’s µf (i, j, z).
In our setup husband and wife save resources to finance the production of the public
good q. Therefore, knowing transfers tm, tf is not very useful. What we want to know
is how much the consumption of the public good q does contribute to individual welfare
net of the costs tm and tf . That is exactly what the equivalent transfer aims to quantify.
The µm, µf thus measure the willingness to pay for a marriage of given characteristics.
Marriage is consummated if and only if both µm and µf are positive.
9.2 Measuring the gains from marriage
Figure 12 displays the dynamics of wages and willingness to pay for marriage over the
period. Marriage is worth a lot, a hefty proportion of the wage, and the willingness to pay
for marriage increases faster than wages. There is evidence of redistribution (µf > µm,
albeit slightly, while wj < wi).
Figure 13 shows the ratio µf
µf+µm
by spouses’ education. The willingness to pay for
marriage increases with education but low-educated women obtain less than the fair
share, and high-educated women obtain more. Women’s share increases over time for less
educated women.
Finally, we display in Figure 14 mean values of µm, µf by both spouses’ wages, family
values and education as estimated for one representative cross-section, 1999-2000. The
willingness to pay for marriage varies more by spouses’ wages than by family values
or education. These are interesting results. We have already established that wage
complementarity does not affect public good quality, unlike education and family values,
as there is less sorting on wages than there is on education and family values. This is
because income is far more transferable than education or family values. In other words,
education and family values are a stronger source of homophily than wages because they
affect preferences in a non – at least less – transferable way.
24 Chiappori and Meghir call it a Money Metric Welfare Index.
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Fig. 12: Wages and willingness to pay for marriage
1995 2000 2005
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Wife, HS dropout
1995 2000 2005
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Wife, High School
1995 2000 2005
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Wife, College
Husband <HS
Husband HS
Husband >HS
Fig. 13: Willingness to pay for marriage by education (share µf
µf+µm
)
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Fig. 14: Willingness to pay for marriage by both spouses’ types (isolines), 1999-2000
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Fig. 15: Income inequality
9.3 Within and between-household welfare inequality
We now consider the total equivalent incomes Ii ≡ wi+µm and Ij ≡ wj +µf for male and
female spouses. Figure 15 shows variances of spouses’ incomes and their correlation. The
variance of total equivalent income is obviously necessarily greater than the variances
of wages, and it also increases faster. The correlation between spouses’ total equivalent
incomes is twice the correlation of wages, and it increases between 1991 and 2008 from
60% to 70%.
We then calculate the within (intra)-household variance
EV [I|i, j] = E
[
I2i + I
2
j
2
−
(
Ii + Ij
2
)2]
=
V(Ii − Ij)
4
+
(EIi − EIj)2
4
,
and the between (inter)-household variance
VE [I|i, j] = V
(
Ii + Ij
2
)
=
V(Ii + Ij)
4
.
Figure 16 shows this decomposition. The between-household variance dominates the
within-household variance, and this increasingly more over the years.
Finally, we compare and contrast intra- and inter-household variances for wages alone
and welfare indices (w + µ) separately. The right panel of the figure shows the ratio of
the between-household variance to the total variance separately for w + µ and w. The
dynamics of these two ratios mimic the dynamics of correlations. The within-household
income variance is considerably reduced in proportion to the between-household variance,
when intra-household transfers are taken into consideration, because the total incomes of
both spouses are much more alike than their ex ante wages. There is thus considerable
redistribution within the household, and increasingly more over the 1991-2008 period.
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10 Conclusion
In this paper we build a model of marriage formation and within-household allocation of
resources. By endogenizing marriage formation as the result of Nash bargaining between
spouses, we are able to identify the level of transfers between spouses (and not only
the link to distribution factors). Identification of the levels of transfers only requires a
normalization of the level of the household production function for singles as in stable
matching models a la Shapley-Shubik.
Adding search frictions to the matching framework is likely not altering the funda-
mental properties of matching models both in terms of their theoretical properties and
as far as identification is concerned (see for example the equivalence result of Adachi,
2003). The main contribution of this paper is therefore not search frictions per se, but
the search-matching framework rather easily allows to put together in the same model
considerations about matching and considerations about task sharing. It is then only
by using both information on matching probabilities by spouses’ characteristics (wages,
education, family values) and on the link between time uses of both spouses and these
characteristics, that we are able to identify the levels of transfers and the individual values
of marriage.
We estimate that most of the observed changes in task sharing in the 1991-2008
period is due to changes in the structure of the home-production function. Most of the
observed sorting in the marriage market results from homophilic preference and not from
intra-household gains from time use trade. The contribution of the marriage market
equilibrium to wage elasticities of paid work hours is sizable. Lastly, the willingness to
pay for marriage of married individuals is huge, comparable to wages, and there is a
considerable amount of redistribution at work in the household.
In future work it will be interesting to explore further the subjects of study of family
economics, such as fertility and children, divorce laws, the evaluation of family tax credits,
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etc. In addition, our description of matching can and should be improved by introducing
other individual characteristics such as people’s age and children. Allowing for other types
of shocks and uncertainty, such as wage and unemployment shocks is also important. More
generally, we should aim at understanding better the link between marriage and labor
markets. For example, women who specialize in home production may be losing human
capital. These are just a few examples of the many extensions that come to mind.
Appendix
A Equilibrium solution with transferable utility
Match surplus. Spouses solve the Nash bargaining problem
max
c,dm,df ,tm,tf
[
Wm − V 0i
]β [
Wf − V 0j
]1−β
subject to c = tm + tf and with
um = q
wi(1− dm)− tm −Ai
Bi
, q = zF 1ij(c, dm, df ),
and
(r + δ)
[
Wm − V 0i
]
= um + δ
ˆ (
V 1m(z
′)− V 0i
)+
dG(z′)− rV 0i ≡ um + vm (say).
The first-order conditions for transfers tm, tf ,
β
(r + δ)[Wm − V 0i ]
∂um
∂R
=
1− β
(r + δ)[Wf − V 0j ]
∂uf
∂R
,
yield the rent sharing conditions
β
um + vm
q
Bi
=
1− β
uf + vf
q
Bj
≡ q
Sij(z)
(say).
It follows that
Sij(z) = Bi(um + vm) +Bj(uf + vf ) = Bi(um + vm) +Bj(uf + vf )− qc,
using tm + tf = c and with
um = q
wi(1− dm)−Ai
Bi
.
Domestic production inputs. The first-order condition for c, dm, df is
widm
m
=
wjdf
f
=
c

= q
[
∂um/∂q
∂um/∂R
+
∂uf/∂q
∂uf/∂R
]
= wi(1− dm)−Ai + wj(1− df )−Aj − c,
for elasticities m =
∂ lnF 1ij(c,dm,df )
∂ ln dm
, f , . The optimal home-production inputs c, dm, df and
home-production output q are thus simple functions of match characteristics. Let Xij be the
equilibrium value of wi(1− dm)−Ai +wj(1− df )−Aj − c obtained from the above first-order
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conditions. Because of the multiplicative nature of the dependence of home production to z –
q = zF 1ij(c, dm, df ) – Xij only depends on i, j and not z.
Continuation values. Making use of the promise keeping constraints, Wm = V 1m(z), we have
(r + δ)
[
V 1m(z)− V 0i
]
= um + vm = β
Sij(z)
Bi
,
(r + δ)
[
V 1f (z)− V 0j
]
= uf + vf = (1− β)Sij(z)
Bj
.
Hence
vm ≡ δ
ˆ (
V 1m(z
′)− V 0i
)+
dG(z′)− rV 0i =
δβ
r + δ
Sij
Bi
− rV 0i ,
vf ≡ δ
ˆ (
V 1f (z
′)− V 0j
)+
dG(z′)− rV 0j =
δ(1− β)
r + δ
Sij
Bj
− rV 0j ,
for Sij ≡
´
Sij(z
′)+ dG(z′), and
Sij(z) = Bi(um − rV 0i ) +Bj(uf − rV 0j )− qc+
δ
r + δ
Sij .
Thus Sij(z) solves the integral equation
Sij(z) = qXij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j +
δ
r + δ
ˆ
Sij(z
′)+ dG(z′), (A.1)
where qXij ≡ zQij (say) is the joint utility um+uf . Transfers follow from the above rent sharing
equations as
q [wi(1− dm)− tm −Ai] = BirV 0i + β
[
qXij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j
]
, (A.2)
with a similar expression for tf . Note that we can then write
wi(1− dm)− tm −Ai = βij(z)Xij , wj(1− df )− tf −Aj = [1− βij(z)]Xij ,
for βij(z) = β + 1z
BirV
0
i −β[BirV 0i +BjrV 0j ]
Qij
.
Singles. It remains to work out the value for singles, i.e.
rV 0i = max
d
ψi
[
wi(1− d), F 0i (d)
]
+ β
λ
r + δ
1
Bi
¨
Sij(z)
+dG(z)nf (j) dj, (A.3)
with a similar expression for females.
Solving for values. Let Sij ≡
´
Sij(z)
+dG(z) denote the integrated surplus. The following
fixed-point equation thus defines Sij :
Sij = QijG
(
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j − δr+δSij
Qij
)
, (A.4)
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with G(s) ≡ ´ (z − s)+ dG(z) = ´ +∞s z dG(z) − s[1 − G(s)]. Note that G′(s) = −[1 − G(s)] ∈
(−1, 0) for all interior point s. Hence G is a contracting operator.25 Moreover,
BirV
0
i = Biψ
0
i +
λβ
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnf (j) dj, (A.5)
and
BjrV
0
j = Bjψ
0
j +
λ(1− β)
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnm(i) di. (A.6)
These two equation define
(
Sij , BirV
0
i , BjrV
0
j
)
as a fixed-point of a contracting operator. Then
Sij(z) follow.
B Identification of preferences and home production
B.1 An inversion formula for values
In this section, we show that values Sij , V 0i , V
0
j are uniquely obtained from matching probabilities
αij given the other parameters.
Let Sij ≡
´
Sij(z)
+dG(z) denote the integrated surplus. It solves the fixed-point equation:
Sij
Qij
= G
(
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
Qij
− δ
r + δ
Sij
Qij
)
, (B.1)
with G(s) ≡ ´ (z − s)+ dG(z) = ´ +∞s z dG(z)− s[1−G(s)]. In addition,
BirV
0
i = Biψ
0
i + β
λ
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnf (j) dj, ψ
0
i ≡ max
d
ψ(w(1− d), F 0(x, d)),
with a similar expression for for BjrV 0j with 1− β instead of β.
Next, consider the definition of the matching probability:
αij = Pr{Sij(z) > 0}
= Pr
{
zQij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j +
δ
r + δ
Sij > 0
}
= 1−G
(
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
Qij
− δ
r + δ
Sij
Qij
)
= 1−G
[
G−1
(
Sij
Qij
)]
.
Hence,
Sij
Qij
= G [G−1(1− αij)] .
25 In the particular lognormal case of G(s) = Φ(ln s/σz) and G−1(x) = eσzΦ
−1(x), then
G(s) = −sΦ
(
− ln s
σz
)
+ e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
− ln s
σz
+ σz
)
.
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Inverting equation (B.1),
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
Qij
− δ
r + δ
Sij
Qij
= G−1
(
Sij
Qij
)
,
it follows that
Sij =
(
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
)
θij ,
with
θij ≡ Sij
Qij
Qij
BirV 0i +BjrV
0
j
=
G [G−1(1− αij)]
G−1(1− αij) + δr+δG [G−1(1− αij)]
This implies that
(
BirV
0
i , BjrV
0
j
)
is a fixed point of the operator (Tm, Tf ) with
BirV
0
i = Tm
(
BirV
0
i , BjrV
0
j
)
= Biψ
0
i +
λ
r + δ
β
ˆ (
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
)
θij nf (j) dj,
and
BjrV
0
j = Tf
(
BirV
0
i , BjrV
0
j
)
= Bjψ
0
j +
λ
r + δ
(1− β)
ˆ (
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
)
θij nm(i) di.
This is a linear system that can be easily solved for after discretizing the state space, or
value function iteration. Suppose that i and j are discrete variables. Define the matrices
Θm = − λβ
r + δ
[θij nf (j)]ij , Θf = −
λ(1− β)
r + δ
[θij nm(i)]
>
ij ,
and
∆m = 1− λβ
r + δ
diag
(∑
j
θij nf (j)
)
i
, ∆f = 1− λ(1− β)
r + δ
diag
(∑
i
θij nm(i)
)
j
.
Then [
BirV
0
i
BjrV
0
j
]
=
(
∆m Θm
Θf ∆f
)−1 [
Biψ
0
i
Bjψ
0
j
]
.
In Appendix C, we show how a similar approach can be used with a continuous state space. We
use Chebyshev nodes for the discretization grid and Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature to approximate
the integral.
Note lastly that the normalization of the production function for singles implies an implicit
normalization of present values for singles and match surplus.
B.2 Mean transfers
The inversion formula in Appendix B.1 allows to calculate BirV 0i and BjrV
0
j given demographic
parameters λ, δ, nm(i) and nf (j), matching probabilities αij , the bargaining power coefficient
β, and preference/domestic production parameters
Biψ
0
i ≡
(
K0i
wi
)K0i (wi(1−D0i )−Ai
1 +K0i
)1+K0i
, Bjψ
0
j ≡
(
K0j
wj
)K0j (wj(1−D0j )−Aj
1 +K0j
)1+K0j
.
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Then, with θij =
G[G−1(1−αij)]
G−1(1−αij)+ δr+δG[G−1(1−αij)]
,
Sij = θij(BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j ), Qij =
Sij
G [G−1(1− αij)] .
And we can calculate transfers using equation (5.9):
wi(1− d1m)− tm −Ai = βij(z)Xij ,
for βij(z) = β + 1z
BirV
0
i −β[BirV 0i +BjrV 0j ]
Qij
.
Let tmij = E(tm|i, j, Sij(z) > 0) and tfij = E(tf |i, j, Sij(z) > 0). As
Sij(z) ≥ 0⇔ z ≥
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j
Qij
− δ
r + δ
Sij
Qij
= G−1
(
Sij
Qij
)
= G−1(1− αij),
we have
wi(1− d1m)− tmij −Ai
Xij
= β +
1
E
(
1
z |z > G−1(1− αij)
) (1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
Qij
≡ βij , (B.2)
and
wj(1− d1f )− tfij −Aj = (1− βij)Xij .
Note finally that with z log normal LN (0, σ2z), the distribution of 1/z is also log normal
LN (0, σ2z). Hence
E (1/z|z > s) = eσ
2
z
2 Φ
(
− ln s
σz
− σz
)
/Φ
(
− ln s
σz
)
, (B.3)
B.3 Variance of match-specific shock σ2z
Male leisure demand satisfies the equation
wi(e
1
m −A′i)
ηi
= wi(1− d1m)− tm −Ai
with ηi = B′i/Bi is the income elasticity of leisure. Hence
wi(e
1
m −A′i)
ηiXij
= β +
1
z
(1− β)BirV 0i + βBjrV 0j
Qij
.
For the parametric specification,
A′i =
a1m
1− bmwi − 2
a2m
2− bmw
2
i , ηi = bm.
Moreover,
Xij =
wi(e
1
m −A′i)
ηi
+
wj(e
1
f −A′j)
ηj
.
Given that the first order moments of couples’ leisure are already fitted, we can base the esti-
mation of σz on fitting the second-order moments of
Yi ≡ wi(e
1
m −A′i)
ηiXij
− β, Yj =
wj(e
1
f −A′j)
ηjXij
− β.
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With z log normal LN (0, σ2z),
E
(
1/z2|z > s) = e2σ2zΦ(− ln s
σz
− 2σz
)
/Φ
(
− ln s
σz
)
.
C Computational details
This appendix shortly describes the numerical tools used in estimation.
First, we discretize continuous functions on a compact domain using Chebyshev grids.26 For
example, let [x, x] denote the support of male wages, we construct a grid of n+ 1 points as
xj =
x+ x
2
+
x− x
2
cos
jpi
n
, j = 0, ..., n.
Second, to estimate wage densities m(x, y)/N , um(x)/Um and uf (y)/Uf on those grids we
use kernel density estimators with a lot of smoothing. This is important as, for instance, we
divide m by umuf to calculate α.
Third, many equations involve integrals. Given Chebyshev grids, it is natural to use Clenshaw-
Curtis quadrature to approximate these integrals:
xˆ
x
f(x) dx ' x− x
2
n∑
j=0
wjf(xj),
where the weights wj can be easily computed using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The following
MATLAB code can be used to implement CC quadrature (Waldvogel, 2006):
function [nodes,wcc] = cc(n)
nodes = cos(pi*(0:n)/n);
N=[1:2:n-1]’; l=length(N); m=n-l;
v0=[2./N./(N-2); 1/N(end); zeros(m,1)];
v2=-v0(1:end-1)-v0(end:-1:2);
g0=-ones(n,1); g0(1+l)=g0(1+l)+n; g0(1+m)=g0(1+m)+n;
g=g0/(n^2-1+mod(n,2)); wcc=real(ifft(v2+g));
wcc=[wcc;wcc(1)];
Note that, although Gaussian quadrature provides exact evaluations of integrals for higher order
polynomials than CC, in practice CC works as well as Gaussian. On the other hand, quadrature
weights are much more difficult to calculate for Gaussian quadrature. See Trefethen (2008).
Fourth, we need to solve functional fixed point equations. The standard algorithm to calcu-
late the fixed point u(x) = T [u](x) is to iterate up+1(x) = Tup(x) on a grid. If the fixed point
operator T involves integrals, we simply iterate the finite dimensional operator T̂ obtained by
replacing the integrals by their approximations at grid points. For example, an equation like
u(x) = T [u](x) =
`(x)
1 + ρ
´ x
x u(y)α(x, y) dy
becomes
u = [u(xj)]j=0,...,n = T̂ (u) =
[
`(xj)
1 + ρ
∑n
k=0wku(xk)α(xj , xk)
]
j=0,...,n
.
26 It can be shown that the error associated to a polynomial approximation (of any order) of an unknown
function at any point x is proportional to
∏n
j=0(x − xj). The Chebyshev points are the {xj}j=0,...n
minimizing this quantity.
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It was sometimes necessary to “shrink” steps by using iterations of the form up+1 = up+θ(Tup−
up) with θ ∈ (0, 1]. A stepsize θ < 1 may help if T is not everywhere strictly contracting.
Fifth, the fact that CC quadrature relies on Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind also
allows to interpolate functions very easily between points y0 = f(x0), ..., yn = f(xn) using
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT):
f(x) =
n∑
k=0
Yk · Tk(x), (C.1)
where Yk are the OLS estimates of the regression of y = (y0, ..., yn) on Chebyshev polynomials
Tk(x) = cos
(
k arccos
(
x− x+x2
x−x
2
))
,
but are more effectively calculated using FFT. A MATLAB code for DCT is, with y = (y0, ..., yn):
Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:);
Y = real(fft(Y/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)];
f = @(x) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin))
*(0:n))*Y(1:n+1);
A bidimensional version is
Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:);
Y = real(fft(Y/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)];
Y = Y(:,[1:n+1 n:-1:2]);
X = real(fft(X’/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)]’;
f=@(x,y) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin))*(0:n))...
*Y(1:n+1,1:n+1)...
*cos((0:n)’*acos((2*y’-(ymin+ymax))/(ymax-ymin)));
The fact that the grid (x0, ..., xn) is not uniform and is denser towards the edges of the support
interval allows to minimize the interpolation error and thus avoids the standard problem of
strong oscillations at the edges of the interpolation interval (Runge’s phenomenon).
Another advantage of DCT is that, having calculated Y0, ..., Yn, then polynomial projections
of y = (y0, ..., yn) of any order p ≤ n are obtained by stopping the summation in (C.1) at k = p.
Finally, it is easy to approximate the derivative f ′ or the primitive
´
f simply by differentiating
or integrating Chebyshev polynomials using
cos(k arccosx)′ =
k sin(k arccosx)
sin(arccosx)
,
and
ˆ
cos(k arccosx) dx =

x if k = 0,
x2
2 if k = 1,
cos(k+1)x
2(k+1) − cos(k−1)x2(k−1) if k ≥ 2.
In calculating an approximation of the derivative, it is useful to smoothen the function by
summing over only a few polynomials. Derivatives are otherwise badly calculated near the
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boundary. Moreover, our experience is that the approximation:
ˆ x
x
1{t ≤ x}f(x) dx '
n∑
k=0
wk1{t ≤ xk}f(xk)
gave similar results as integrating the interpolated function.
We implemented these procedures with numbers of grid points such as n = 50, 100, 500 on a
laptop without running into any memory or computing time difficulty.
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